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1 
De Jure Segregation’s Role in the Miseducation of African Americans: Protecting Affirmative 
Action Admissions Programs 
Goldie Bryant* 
 
I. Introduction 
 The crisis of unequal educational opportunities for African Americans continues to be a 
dilemma in the United States.1  The transgenerational connection is unbroken between slavery,  
the systematic denial of education, mass incarceration, the depression of income and wealth 
accumulation through restricted job and homeownership opportunities, legal segregation in 
housing and in schools, and today’s largely segregated educational system that is failing to educate 
African Americans.2  Unconstitutional laws and policies at the federal, state, and local government 
levels sanctioned de jure segregation—segregation “existing by right or according to law.”3  As a 
result of de jure segregation, African American students today disproportionately attend 
segregated schools with more concentrated poverty than white students.4  Research shows that 
“systemic and racial isolation” in schools is widespread in American cities and is associated with 
the racial academic achievement gap.5  Schools in poor communities have less resources, less 
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1  See Ronald Brownstein, The Challenge of Educational Inequality, ATLANTIC (May 19, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/05/education-inequality-takes-center-stage/483405/. 
2 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 386–95 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing the position 
of African Americans in America after “centuries of unequal treatment”). 
3  See Richard Rothstein, Commentary, The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated Schools, and Segregated 
Neighborhoods—A Constitutional Insult, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-
racial-achievement-gap-segregated-schools-and-segregated-neighborhoods-a-constitutional-insult/.  De Jure, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th Pocket ed. 2016). 
4  Janie Boschma, Separate and Still Unequal, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/03/separate-still-unequal/471720/; Brownstein supra note 1 
(noting three-fourths of African American students attend majority low-income schools as opposed to only one third 
of white students). 
5 Janie Boschma & Ronald Brownstein, The Concentration of Poverty in American Schools, ATLANTIC (Feb. 29, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/02/concentration-poverty-american-schools/471414/. 
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educated parents, and lower quality teachers with higher turnover rates. 6   The substandard 
segregated education provided to African Americans today is a lingering “badge” of slavery 
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment, and the failure of legislators to effectively address 
segregated educational inequality violates the equal protection of African Americans as promised 
in the Fourteenth Amendment.7  Because government action promoted de jure segregation, which 
is responsible for the resulting miseducation of African Americans—as opposed to private societal 
discrimination, the government has a compelling interest in remedying the harmful effects of its 
actions.8 
 Despite the crisis of African American miseducation, the Justice Department’s civil rights 
division is focusing its limited resources on investigating affirmative action admissions policies at 
the university level. 9   In August 2017, The New York Times exposed a Justice Department 
document seeking internal lawyers for potential litigation in connection with “intentional race-
based discrimination” in admissions policies.10  The term “intentional race-based discrimination” 
suggests the new administration’s Justice Department intends to challenge existing affirmative 
action admissions policies that are considered by some to discriminate against white applicants.11  
The Justice Department’s actions, coupled with the likely appointment of one or more additional 
conservative Justices to the Supreme Court during the Trump administration, do not bode well for 
the protection of affirmative action admissions programs.  Instead, the very foundation of 
affirmative action in higher education will be challenged by attacking Harvard College’s “holistic” 
                                                     
6 Id. 
7 U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.  See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW VIII–XI, 195–97 (2017). 
8 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 7, at 198. 
9 Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. to Take on Affirmative Action in College Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/us/politics/trump-affirmative-action-universities.html?mcubz=0&_r=0. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
  
 
 
 
3 
admissions program, the model affirmative action admissions program endorsed by Justice 
Powell’s 1978 opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.12 
 The ironic trend of using the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
prevent discrimination against non-minorities as the basis for stifling affirmative action programs, 
which address the staggering educational inequality experienced by African Americans in the 
United States, will likely continue under the current administration’s leadership.13  Rather than 
using equal protection for necessary remedial reforms to uplift African Americans from the 
entrenched subordination they have been subjected to, the guarantee of equal protection is being 
used to maintain the “racial status quo.”14   
 In addition to Supreme Court rulings over the past few decades limiting the consideration 
of race in admissions policies,15 the backlash against affirmative action can be seen at the state 
level where eight states, so far, have banned the use of race-based affirmative action.16  The 
combined actions of the Court, the federal government, and state governments indicate a serious 
threat to affirmative action admissions programs and, in turn, a serious threat to mitigating the 
unequal educational opportunities for African Americans. 
 Understanding the legislative intent behind the “reconstruction amendments” provides an 
essential historical context for understanding the unique relationship between the equal protection 
laws of the United States and African Americans.17  Not only did the Thirteenth Amendment 
                                                     
12 438 U.S. 265, 317 (1978). 
13 See Ian Haney-Lopez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1781 (2012). 
14 Id. 
15 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S.Ct. 2198 (2016); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
16 Tamar Lewin & Richard Perez-Pena, Colleges Brace for Supreme Court Review of Race-Based Admissions, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/us/politics/colleges-brace-for-supreme-court-review-
of-admissions.html. 
17 See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Remembering How to Do Equality, in THE CONSTITUTION IN  2020 93–95 
(Jack M. Balkin & Reva Siegel eds., 2009). 
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abolish slavery, but the Supreme Court held that the amendment empowered Congress “to pass all 
laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”18  
This interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment allows for the possibility of using the amendment 
for civil rights reforms, especially for African Americans who were the targeted beneficiaries of 
the amendment.19  Despite the race-neutral language of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Court 
and scholars alike have recognized, there is no question that its framers intended to protect the 
newly freed slaves from states that would use laws to deny the former slaves equal citizenship.20  
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were specifically intended to abolish slavery, destroy 
all “badges and incidents of slavery” that would create second-class citizens, and prevent 
government actions that would violate the rights of African Americans.21  The original promises 
of these amendments have yet to be fully realized for the descendants of slavery. 
 This Comment proposes a different approach to assessing the constitutionality of 
affirmative action admissions policies in relation to African Americans. It argues that remedying 
the impact of unconstitutional de jure segregation on the miseducation of African Americans is 
both a compelling government interest and a constitutional obligation that requires protecting 
affirmative action admissions programs benefitting African Americans under the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Part II explores the evolving interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause as it relates to safeguarding African Americans’ rights.  Part III reviews the history of race-
based affirmative action admissions decisions, which were based on the faulty strict scrutiny 
                                                     
18 William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1313 (2007) (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)). 
19 Id. at 1317. 
20 Balkin, supra note 17, at 93–94. 
21 Id. See also Carter, supra note 18, at 1313–15. 
  
 
 
 
5 
standard analysis and where the role of de jure segregation’s impact was never addressed.  Part IV 
examines how applying the strict scrutiny standard weakened affirmative action admissions 
policies by focusing on racial classifications rather than on the underlying structural inequalities 
facing African Americans.  Part V analyzes the relationship between de jure segregation and the 
miseducation of African Americans.  Part VI explains why the higher education of African 
Americans is a compelling government interest and a constitutional obligation.  Finally, Part VII 
concludes that the government has an obligation to remedy the impact of unconstitutional de jure 
segregation on the miseducation of African Americans and that protecting and strengthening 
affirmative action admissions programs is critical to ensuring equality by dismantling the current 
unequal educational system. 
II. The Evolution of Equal Protection and African Americans’ Rights 
A. The Separate but Equal Doctrine 
 The Supreme Court failed to protect the civil rights of African Americans in Plessy v. 
Ferguson. 22   By endorsing the “separate but equal doctrine,” the Court ensured that white 
dominance would continue to be legally sanctioned so long as laws appeared to apply equally to 
the races.23 
 On June 7, 1892, Plessy, who was 7/8 Caucasian and 1/8 African, paid for first-class rail 
fare and attempted to sit in a whites-only section of an East Louisiana Railway car.24  Plessy 
refused to comply with the conductor’s orders to move to a colored section of the train, was 
forcibly removed, and was then imprisoned and charged under an 1890 Louisiana Act requiring 
                                                     
22 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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separate accommodations on trains for white and colored passengers, which had an exception for 
“nurses attending to children of the other race.”25  Plessy challenged the act as unconstitutional on 
the ground that it violated both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.26   
 The Supreme Court found that the act did not conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment 
because the Court interpreted the amendment as primarily abolishing slavery or involuntary 
servitude and not as protecting “coloreds” from laws imposing “onerous disabilities and burdens” 
or from laws interfering with their rights to “the pursuit of life, liberty, and property.”27  The Court 
noted that legal distinctions between races were not only permissible in state statutes because the 
distinctions had no impact on legal equality but that they “must always exist so long as white men 
are distinguished from the other race by color.” 28   While this analysis of the Thirteenth 
Amendment narrowly defined its reach, the analysis clearly acknowledged the significance and 
legality of racial distinctions between whites and African Americans. 
 The Court, however, determined that the Fourteenth Amendment applied in this case 
because a “main purpose” of the amendment was to “establish the citizenship of the negro.”29  The 
Court also stated that the amendment was intended to “enforce absolute equality of the two races 
before the law” while not abolishing racial distinctions or enforcing social equality.30  Using a 
standard of reasonableness, the Court found that the enforced separation of the races (long held 
valid in the creation of separate schools for whites and “coloreds”) did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment because the two races were equal under the law and the state legislatures were allowed 
                                                     
25 Id. at 537–41. 
26 Id. at 542. 
27 Id. 
28 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 543. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 544. 
  
 
 
 
7 
to consider established customs and traditions in their efforts to preserve the “public peace” when 
creating laws.31  Separate but equal was declared reasonable.32  By allowing state legislatures to 
use customs and traditions to justify race-based laws, the Court gave states permission to continue 
creating legislation that maintained white dominance by effectively disenfranchising African 
Americans.  
 Justice Harlan, dissenting, acknowledged that the Louisiana statute’s obvious and known 
purpose was to keep colored people out of white coaches “under the guise of giving equal 
accommodation for whites and blacks.”33  Justice Harlan objected to the statute as violating the 
“personal freedom of citizens” and reasoned that the “arbitrary separation of citizens” traveling on 
public highways because of race was a “badge of servitude” and was not equal protection of the 
law.34  The Justice astutely predicted that the decision would lead to more state laws designed to 
defeat the purposes of the “recent amendments” to the Constitution, allowing “race hate” to be 
legally sanctioned.35   
B. Separate Educational Facilities as Inherently Unequal 
 Six decades after the flawed decision in Plessy, the Court had another opportunity to assess 
the unconstitutionality of the “separate but equal doctrine” in Brown v. Board of Education, which 
involved class actions in four states where African American students sought admission to 
segregated public schools that either legally required or permitted racial segregation. 36   The 
plaintiffs challenged the segregated public schools as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the 
                                                     
31 Id. at 550–51. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 557. 
34 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557, 562. 
35 Id. at 560. 
36 347 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1954). 
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Fourteenth Amendment arguing that segregated public schools were “not ‘equal’ and cannot be 
made ‘equal.’”37  The three decisions adverse to the plaintiffs cited the Court’s “separate but equal” 
doctrine announced in Plessy as justifying segregated public schools so long as the races were 
provided with “substantially equal facilities.”38  A decision by the Supreme Court of Delaware 
was the sole opinion favorable to the plaintiffs.39  The Delaware Court ordered admission of the 
plaintiffs into the white schools because they were superior to the “Negro” schools, even while 
agreeing with the “separate but equal” doctrine.40  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve 
the conflicting decisions.41   
 While the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was offered as evidence of the 
constitutional violation resulting from segregated public schools, the Court found the evidence 
inconclusive because the amendment’s intended effect on public education was not clear 
historically.42  Given the evolution of education from the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
in 1868, to the Plessy decision in 1896, and finally to 1954, when Brown was decided, the Court 
noted that it was necessary to consider present-day public education and its current place in 
American society.43  Deeming education “perhaps the most important” state and local government 
function, Chief Justice Warren concluded that, where provided, the opportunity for a public 
education was “a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”44 
                                                     
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 488. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Brown, 347 U.S. at 489–90. 
43 Id. at 492. 
44 Id. at 493. 
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 In deciding whether the “separate but equal” doctrine applied, the Court determined that 
the decision could not rest on simply comparing “tangible factors” of the segregated schools such 
as facilities, curricula, and teacher qualifications.45  Instead, the Court decided that it was necessary 
to look at the “effect of segregation itself on public education.”46  In evaluating the effects of 
segregation on African American children, the Court ironically relied on the Kansas court’s 
findings that legally sanctioned segregation had “a detrimental effect upon the colored children,” 
impedes their “educational and mental development,” and deprives them from benefitting from 
integrated schools. 47   The Court declared that “separate but equal” did not apply to public 
education because segregated public schools were “inherently unequal” and, therefore, segregated 
schools violated equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.48   
 The Court reasoned that public education evolved between 1868, when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was adopted, and 1954, when Brown was decided.49  The Court, therefore, concluded 
that it must view public education through a contemporary lens.50  This reasoning can and should 
be extended to the present when determining the effects of de jure segregation on public education 
and the role of public higher education in American society because today’s bachelor’s degree is 
arguably equivalent to the high school diploma of the 1950s.  Given the continued evolution of 
education in American society from 1954 to today, the finding in Brown that education is one of 
the most important functions of state and local governments should be extended to public higher 
education and require equal access to all. 
                                                     
45 Id. at 492. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 494. 
48 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
49 Id. at 492. 
50 Id. 
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C. Modern Interpretation of Equal Protection: Maintaining the Status Quo 
 After the Brown decision, along with pressure from the Civil Rights Movement, Congress 
enacted laws and the Executive branch created school desegregation guidelines to dismantle the 
unequal, segregated public education system.51  Equal protection laws promoting “fair procedures” 
and “individual liberty” acknowledged and addressed violations of the civil rights of African 
Americans and other subordinated groups.52  The guarantee of “equal protection” as decided in 
Brown promoted reform across the nation.53  The Brown decision and the reforms that followed 
led to a backlash and the election of presidents who promised to appoint Justices who would disrupt 
the trajectory of equal protection law.54  The Nixon election in 1968 and re-election in 1972 
followed campaigns incorporating anti-civil rights messages that appealed to white voters. 55  
Nixon honored his campaign promises and appointed four Justices that changed the direction of 
the Supreme Court and equal protection law.56  
 Beginning in the 1970s, the Court redefined discrimination as “forbidden classifications” 
as opposed to the previous focus on legally sanctioned subordination.57  Focusing on merely the 
use of racial classifications—and disregarding the underlying purpose of laws—served to equate 
laws meant to aid subordinated groups with laws that intentionally “advantaged dominant 
groups.”58  As a result, the Court began subjecting to strict scrutiny all laws that classified on the 
basis of race.59  At the same time, the Court made it extremely difficult to challenge facially neutral 
                                                     
51 See Balkin, supra note 17, at 97–99. 
52 Id. 
53 Haney-Lopez, supra note 13, at 1781. 
54 Balkin, supra note 17, at 95. 
55 Haney-Lopez, supra note 13, at 1799. 
56 Id. 
57 Balkin, supra note 17, at 95. 
58 Id. at 95–96. 
59 Id. 
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laws that discriminated against minorities by requiring challenges to show that any disparate 
impact upon minorities was motivated by state actors’ actual malice—an almost impossible 
standard of proof.60  This approach severely limited the relevance of laws’ disparate impact on 
minorities.61  The Court effectively began to use equal protection law to maintain the racial status 
quo of inequality by subjecting affirmative action policies to the highest level of scrutiny, strict 
scrutiny.62   
 The “colorblindness” approach to evaluating policies that use race-based classifications 
claims that the Constitution is colorblind, and that whether the motives behind race-based laws are 
benign or invidious is unknowable, and, therefore, the use of racial classifications is prohibited 
unless strict scrutiny standards are met.63   Under this approach to judicial review, legitimate 
remedial goals of the challenged policies are considered irrelevant, and the policies will be suspect 
simply because of the use of race as a classification.64   
 Meanwhile, the Court made it nearly impossible for non-whites to prove discrimination 
from facially neutral laws under the “intent” doctrine, which requires plaintiffs to prove malice as 
the state of mind of the accused government actor.65  Since this lenient standard of judicial review 
was announced in the 1970s, the vast majority of discrimination claims by non-whites have been 
rejected.66   
                                                     
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Haney-Lopez, supra note 13, at 1781–83. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
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 The same Court applied these two doctrines, “colorblindness” for affirmative action cases 
and “intent” for discrimination cases, and effectively operated “to defeat challenges to, and 
remedies for, discrimination against non-Whites.”67  The combining of the these doctrines, what 
Ian Haney-Lopez has collectively termed “intentional blindness,” led to a Court in the 1990s that 
did not see discrimination and ultimately allowed for the destruction of affirmative action.68  Over 
the course of a few decades, equal protection law reversed direction in regards to protecting the 
rights of African Americans and other subordinated groups. 
III. History of Race-Based Affirmative Action Admissions Decisions 
A. Regents of California v. Bakke69 
 While heralded as a champion for the “diversity rationale,” which allows for the use of race 
as a factor in admissions decisions to achieve a diverse student body, Bakke effectively “forced a 
decoupling of the value of diversity from the realities of race past and present.”70  Justice Powell’s 
opinion deemed the historical racial experiences of African Americans irrelevant and merely 
endorsed the creation of a diverse student body as a compelling justification for affirmative action 
admissions programs.71  
 The Medical School of the University of California at Davis used two admissions programs: 
a regular admissions program to fill eighty-four places and a special admissions program to fill 
sixteen places for “disadvantaged” minorities.72  Bakke, a white man, who was denied admission 
                                                     
67 Id. at 1784. 
68 Haney-Lopez, supra note 13, at 1784–89. 
69 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
70 Lee C. Bollinger, What Once Was Lost Must Now Be Found: Rediscovering an Affirmative Action Jurisprudence 
Informed by the Reality of Race in America, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 281, 289 (2016). 
71 Id. at 283. 
72 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272–76. 
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in 1973 and 1974, sued claiming the medical school’s special program was discriminatory and  
violated his equal rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 73   The medical school cross-
complained for a declaratory judgment that its admissions program was constitutional.74  The trial 
court ruled that the special admissions program was illegal because it used a racial quota system 
and that the university could not consider race in its admissions decisions.75  It did not, however,  
order the school to admit Bakke.76  The California Supreme Court affirmed the holding that the 
program violated the Constitution.77  But the court reversed the lower court by shifting the burden 
of proof to the University to show that Bakke would not have been admitted to the school if the 
special program had not existed and ultimately ordered the school to admit Bakke.78 
 While acknowledging that the framers originally intended for the Fourteenth Amendment 
to address equal protection of the “Negro race,” Justice Powell noted the Court’s “crucial mission” 
in recent decades was to interpret the Equal Protection Clause as applying to all people.79  Justice 
Powell refused to extend the same approval of preferential classifications as in cases involving 
school desegregation, employment discrimination, and sex discrimination to the University’s 
special admissions program.80  The Justice distinguished the medical school’s special admissions 
programs from prior decisions that remedied “clearly determined constitutional violations” 
reasoning that the University failed to show that it had engaged in discriminatory practices 
requiring remediation.81  Applying strict scrutiny because of the race-based classifications used in 
                                                     
73 Id. at 277–78. 
74 Id. at 278–79. 
75 Id. at 279. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 279. 
79 Id. at 293. 
80 Id. at 300. 
81 Id. at 300–305. 
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the special admissions program, Justice Powell determined that the medical school’s goal of aiding 
minorities that the school “perceived as victims of ‘societal discrimination’” did not justify any 
disadvantage on those, like Bakke, “who bear no responsibility” for the harms minorities have 
suffered.82  Justice Powell failed to acknowledge or address why whites like Bakke had the right 
to benefit from unchecked white privilege resulting from centuries of African American 
subjugation.   
 Justice Powell ruled that the use of racial quotas in the medical school’s special admissions 
program violated equal protection of individual rights.83   Accepting the University’s goal of 
attaining a diverse student body as a compelling interest, citing academic freedom and First 
Amendment concerns, Justice Powell reversed the lower court and declared that using race as a 
factor in admissions programs is constitutional as long as race is used as a “plus” factor and not a 
determining factor.84  The Justice’s non-binding opinion relied heavily on Harvard College’s use 
of race in its holistic admissions program and held it out as an example of the successful use of 
race.85 
 Justice Marshall’s powerful dissent declared that the current position of African Americans 
is the “tragic but inevitable consequence” of over two centuries of  historical subordination of 
African Americans, beginning with slavery and continuing through Jim Crow laws, enforced 
segregation by the federal government under President Wilson, and the exclusion of African 
Americans from public graduate and professional schools.86  Justice Marshall concluded that 
                                                     
82 Id. at 310. 
83 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320. 
84 Id. at 315–20. 
85 Id. at 317. 
86 Id. at 387–95. 
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“meaningful equality remains a distant dream” for African Americans. 87   He argued that 
remedying the impact of the Nation’s past treatment of African Americans should not only be 
considered “a state interest of the highest order,” but that the Fourteenth Amendment was not 
intended to prevent remedial programs.88  While the Bakke opinion failed to acknowledge the 
obvious and undeniable impact of historical subjugation on African Americans, Justice Marshall’s 
separate opinion powerfully demonstrated the relevance of both de jure segregation and past 
discrimination against African Americans in determining the existence of compelling government 
interests in race-based remediation. 
B. Hopwood v. Texas89  
 Demonstrating the fragility of the diversity rationale endorsed in Bakke, in 1996 the Fifth 
Circuit rejected diversity as a compelling government interest when white applicants denied 
admission into the University of Texas School of Law sued alleging that the affirmative action 
admissions program violated their right to equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 90   The law school used separate admissions panels for whites and preferred 
minorities, which applied different threshold scores with the intention of increasing the enrollment 
of minority students.91   
 Applying strict scrutiny, the district court reviewed the admissions program and found that 
attaining a diverse student body and remediating past discrimination in the state’s secondary school 
                                                     
87 Id. at 395. 
88 Id. at 396–97. 
89 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
90 Id. at 938. 
91 Id. at 935–38. 
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system were compelling interests. 92   The district court, however, found that using separate 
admissions panels violated the plaintiffs’ equal protection rights.93 
 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the University of Texas Law School could not use 
race as a factor in its admissions process to create a diverse student body, to improve a hostile 
environment, to repair the school’s reputation, or to mitigate effects of discrimination not directly 
committed by the law school.94  While the district court found a compelling government interest 
in attaining a diverse student body to justify the admissions program, the Court of Appeals declared 
that achieving a diverse student body was not a compelling interest—declining to follow Justice 
Powell’s  non-binding view in Bakke.95  The court also limited the law school to addressing its 
own discrimination and declared it could not remedy past discrimination in education by the state 
of Texas more broadly even though eighty-five percent of the law students were residents of Texas 
and likely products of the Texas educational system.96   
 The Court of Appeals interpreted the ultimate goal of the Fourteenth Amendment to be the 
“end of racially-motivated state action” as opposed to remedying the effects of the de jure 
subordination of African Americans and other minorities. 97   The court further reasoned that 
because the de jure discrimination practiced by the law school, denying blacks admission, ended 
in the 1960s, the law school’s past discrimination was sufficiently addressed.98  The court failed 
to explain exactly what “sufficiently addressed” the admitted de jure discrimination.  The 
Hopwood court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting racial classifications even 
                                                     
92 Id. at 938–39. 
93 Id. at 939. 
94 Id. at 962. 
95 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944. 
96 Id. at 935 n.2, 950. 
97 Id. at 947–48. 
98 Id. at 953. 
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when the intended purpose of the classification is to remedy the historical subordination of 
minorities.99  The court failed to acknowledge the impact of historical de jure discrimination on 
present day outcomes including that whites, while they may not have directly caused the past 
discrimination, benefit from centuries of unequal treatment of African Americans and other 
minorities. 
C. Grutter v. Bollinger100 
 The Grutter decision provided a lifeline to affirmative action admissions programs by 
finding a compelling interest in the diversity rationale.101  After being denied admission to the 
University of Michigan Law School, Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident, sued alleging the 
law school’s admissions policy discriminated against her because of her race violating her equal 
protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.102  The Court of Appeals, en banc, reversed 
the district court, holding that the law school’s goal of a diverse student body was a compelling 
interest and that the school’s use of race was narrowly tailored.103  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to resolve conflicting judgments by the courts of appeals regarding the question of 
whether achieving diversity is a compelling interest that can justify the use of racial classifications 
in public universities’ admissions policies.104  
 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, endorsed Justice Powell’s view that student body 
diversity is a compelling government interest, which justifies the use of race-based admissions 
policies and held that the law school’s goal of achieving the educational benefits of a diverse 
                                                     
99  
100 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
101 Id. at 343. 
102 Id. at 316–17. 
103 Id. at 321. 
104 Id. at 322. 
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student body was compelling.105  Analyzing whether the admissions policy was narrowly tailored 
to pass strict scrutiny, the Court reiterated the requirement that race be used as one factor in a 
broader conception of diversity and that applicants must receive individualized consideration.106  
Continuing the narrow tailoring analysis, Justice O’Connor determined that the law school had 
considered race-neutral alternatives in order to achieve the desired diversity without sacrificing its 
selectivity.107   
 Importantly, Justice O’Connor recognized both the importance of access to public 
institutions of higher education and the reality that “race unfortunately still matters” in America.108  
Even though Justice O’Connor acknowledged the reality that race still matters, she went on to 
conclude that race-conscious admissions policies must necessarily be limited in order to comply 
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose of prohibiting “governmentally imposed” race-based 
discrimination. 109   She posited a twenty-five year expiration on the necessity of racial 
classifications although she did not address how the underlying entrenched structural inequalities 
would be resolved in such a short period.110 
 Justice Ginsburg, concurring, acknowledged that racial discrimination, both conscious and 
unconscious, remains a reality and that minorities continue to receive “inadequate and unequal 
educational opportunities” in inferior segregated schools.111  While both Justices O’Connor and 
Ginsburg acknowledged the actual impact of systematic discrimination on the current state of 
African Americans, the Justices nevertheless suggested that a few decades or even one generation 
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should be long enough to address the entrenched subordination of African Americans and to 
dismantle white dominance.112 
D. Gratz v. Bollinger113 
 In this companion case to Grutter, strict scrutiny was fatal to a program that was 
conceptually similar to the Grutter program.  Here, two white Michigan residents rejected from 
the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science and the Arts (LSA) sued alleging the 
undergraduate admissions process discriminated against them because of their race and violated 
their equal protection rights.114  The challenged admissions policy automatically awarded twenty 
points to the score of underrepresented minority applicants of the total one hundred points needed 
for admission to LSA.115  In reviewing the policy under strict scrutiny, the Court determined that 
automatically giving twenty points to minority applicants was not a narrowly tailored method of 
achieving diversity and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.116  The Court reaffirmed that race may be considered as a “plus” factor in admissions 
policies that provide for individual consideration of applicants, however, race cannot be the 
decisive factor.117 
 Justice Souter dissented, reasoning that the LSA admissions program resembled the 
constitutionally valid policy in Grutter because of its broad conception of diversity and its use of 
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race as one factor of many.118  Justice Souter further asserted that it is impossible to determine 
whether race was the decisive factor for admissions.119   
 Justice Ginsburg, also dissenting, pointed to the legacy of racial oppression to justify a 
lesser standard of scrutiny for race-based actions meant to remediate centuries of legally 
sanctioned inequality.120  Interestingly, Justice Ginsburg concluded that whether an action has the 
purpose of maintaining racial inequality or the purpose of preventing perpetual discrimination and 
undoing the effects of past discrimination is discernible and should dictate whether the 
Constitution should be “color blind” or “color conscious.”121  The Justice concluded that the 
Constitution is “color conscious” when it comes to remedying the impact of past discrimination, 
which should not be confused with invidious race-based actions.122   
E. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin123 
 In response to the Grutter decision, which overruled Hopwood by allowing the use of race 
in admissions policies, the University of Texas at Austin adopted a new admissions program 
comprised of two components.124 The first component was based on a state legislated Top Ten 
Percent Plan—offering admission to Texas high school students graduating in the top 10% of their 
class—and accounted for approximately 75% of the incoming freshman class, and the second 
component involved a holistic approach that considered race as one of several factors for 
admission.125  The Top Ten Percent Plan was enacted in response to Hopwood, which declared 
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that public university admissions policies could not consider race, and guaranteed admission to the 
top 10% of high school graduates from Texas’ segregated schools.126  The second component of 
the admissions program, admitting the remaining 25% of the freshman class, incorporated a 
holistic review process modeled after Grutter, where race was “but a factor of a factor” and not 
the decisive factor.127    
 The University denied admission to Fisher, a white woman, who was not in the top ten 
percent of her graduating class.128  Fisher sued claiming that the University of Texas’ consideration 
of race in its holistic admissions review process disadvantaged her and other white applicants in 
violation of their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.129  The Supreme Court 
vacated the judgment in Fisher I 130  and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals so the 
admissions program could be properly evaluated under the strict scrutiny standard.131  On remand, 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the University.132  Granting certiorari 
a second time, the Court held that the University’s holistic admissions program was constitutional 
because (1) its pursuit of diversity was a compelling government interest, (2) the University 
showed that race-neutral alternatives did not work, and (3) the program was narrowly tailored.133  
 While this close decision upheld the University of Texas’ affirmative action admissions 
program, the Court was divided.134  Justice Thomas dissented, concluding that the use of race in 
admissions decisions is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment and that Grutter should be 
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overruled.135  Justice Alito, dissenting, reasoned that affirmative action admissions programs were 
equivalent to “systematic racial discrimination” and that the University of Texas failed to provide 
an adequate explanation for its admissions program and did not pass the strict scrutiny test.136   
 The fact that the Justices, when presented with the same facts, studies, and history, can be 
so divided as to the legitimacy of affirmative action suggests such programs face a very uncertain 
future that will largely be determined by the Court’s composition.  More importantly, the 
reluctance of conservative Justices to acknowledge the present-day impact of the legally 
sanctioned subjugation of African Americans over centuries makes it doubtful that the Court will 
allow equal protection law to dismantle white domination. 
IV. The Strict Scrutiny Attack on Affirmative Action Admissions Policies 
 In the 1960s the Court applied strict scrutiny to race-based policies that “enforced 
segregation and white supremacy.”137  Conservative leaning Courts began applying strict scrutiny 
to affirmative action programs in the 1970s and 1980s as a tool to strike down affirmative action 
programs as unconstitutional.138  During this time period, the Court began to focus on the use of 
forbidden racial classifications rather than the underlying structural inequalities affecting African 
Americans and other minorities that the affirmative action policies were designed to address.139 
 In Bakke, the Court declared that “[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently 
suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.”140  The Court rejected the 
University’s request that the Court use a more lenient standard of review based on the assertion 
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that white men were not “discrete and insular minorit[ies].”141  The Court refused to accept the 
University’s claim that “discrimination against members of the white ‘majority’ cannot be suspect 
if the purpose can be characterized as benign.”142  This decision equated policies designed to 
remedy racial discrimination and subordination with policies designed to achieve and maintain 
white domination by considering them equally suspect.  The Bakke Court interpreted the Equal 
Protection Clause in accordance with its recent “crucial mission” of extending the clause to all 
persons, not just to African Americans.143   
 By applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action admissions policies, the Court created an 
exceptionally high bar for race-conscious policies to survive.  In order to pass strict scrutiny review, 
race-based affirmative action policies must (1) demonstrate a compelling government interest and 
(2) show that the use of race is necessary and narrowly tailored.144  The Court could have allowed 
for a more lenient standard of review for race-based programs created to remedy the impact of the 
unconstitutional subjugation of African Americans given the unique history of the United States 
and its ruthless subordination of African Americans over centuries.  
 In order for public universities to satisfy strict scrutiny, they must demonstrate a 
compelling government interest.145   Under the Court’s approach, remedying private “societal 
discrimination” is not a constitutionally viable compelling interest.146  Unless a public university 
can show that it engaged in past, intentional discrimination that has present effects, a public 
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university cannot justify the use of race-based admissions policies to address the obvious inequities 
in access to public higher education, especially for African Americans.147   
 Oddly, the one compelling interest (other than a university’s own past discrimination) that 
the Supreme Court has upheld for using race-based affirmative action policies is the attainment of 
the educational benefits of a diverse student body.148  This compelling interest has become a “legal 
fiction” as universities are forced to contort their admissions programs to comply with a strict 
scrutiny standard that refuses to acknowledge the compelling government interest in remedying 
unequal educational opportunities for African Americans and other minorities.  The reality of 
unequal educational opportunities for African Americans is evidenced regularly when educational 
outcome indicators are measured, yet the Court requires universities to ignore these realities.149  
The refusal to acknowledge how states have unconstitutionally, through law and policy, created 
and contributed to a new form of unequal and segregated education systems dramatically limits 
the scope of affirmative action policies.150 
V. De Jure Segregation and the Miseducation of African Americans 
A. Unconstitutional Government Policies and Laws Promoted De Jure Segregation 
 Federal, state, and local government laws and policies created America’s segregated cities 
and neighborhoods that continue to exist today.151  A prime example is Richmond, California, a 
shipbuilding center during World War II where the influx of wartime workers led to a housing 
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shortage.152  During this period, the black population alone grew from 270 to 14,000.153   In 
response to the acute housing shortage and the need for the workers, the federal government 
provided public housing that was “officially and explicitly” segregated with substandard, 
temporary housing built for African Americans in the least desirable areas.154  To limit the African 
American population in Richmond to only those who were “essential to the war effort,” black men 
were stopped on Richmond streets and arrested if they could not prove they had employment 
related to the war.155 
 In addition to providing segregated public housing, the federal government began to 
subsidize the whites-only movement to suburban communities across the nation.  For example, the 
federal government recruited a developer to create a whites-only suburb for Richmond, called 
Rollingwood, and then financed the project with federally approved bank loans with the condition 
that African Americans could not buy any of the 700 homes.156  This practice of government 
financing whites-only suburbs was not equal protection under the law.  The patterns of segregation 
established by federally funded housing, both public housing and suburban housing, was 
widespread and persists today.157 
 Governments used racial zoning as another method to segregate African Americans.  
Beginning in 1910, racial zoning ordinances prohibited African Americans from buying houses in 
white areas.158  In the 1917 case of Buchanan v. Warley, the Supreme Court struck down a racial 
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zoning ordinance in Louisville, Kentucky, as interfering with the right to “freedom of contract.”159  
Justifications for racial zoning ranged from keeping the public peace to preventing illegal 
interracial marriage.160  Many racial zoning ordinances persisted into the 1960s (some longer) and 
these ordinances solidified segregation of the nation.161 
 The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was created in 1934 to promote home-
ownership by middle-class families and required that eligible homes be in whites-only 
neighborhoods, officially mandating racial segregation to participate in the federal mortgage 
program. 162   The FHA financed Levittown, an enormous 17,500 home development, on the 
condition that the homes could only be sold to whites.163  Only white World War II veterans could 
buy Levittown properties with no down payment and low-interest loans guaranteed by the 
government.164   
 In 1973, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that the “housing industry, aided and 
abetted by Government, must bear the primary responsibility for the legacy of segregated 
housing.”165  To attribute today’s segregation to merely private choices or societal discrimination, 
denies the reality that African Americans were systematically herded into specific neighborhoods 
and were denied equal access to jobs, education, housing, and financing for housing.166 
B. Segregation and Education 
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 The landmark 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education was a crucial turning point in the 
relationship between equal protection law and African Americans.167  This long overdue decision 
overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson that permitted states to use their 
laws to subordinate African Americans.168  As a result of the Brown decision, equal protection of 
African Americans in the context of the right to educational opportunities led to reforms and 
schools integration.169  This equal protection of African Americans, however, was short-lived due 
to a backlash against civil rights reforms and the ultimate change in direction of equal protection 
law described above.170 
 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, parents in Seattle 
challenged the school district’s use of white and nonwhite classifications in its assignment plan for 
oversubscribed high schools, and a parent in Kentucky challenged the assignment plan for 
elementary schools and transfer requests using “black” or “other” classifications.171  The common 
issue was whether a public school district that had not previously maintained legally segregated 
schools or a previously segregated school district that was deemed integrated may voluntarily use 
racial classifications when making school assignments.172  The Court concluded that these school 
cases were not governed by Grutter because the compelling interest in a diverse student body in 
the higher education context does not apply to race-based assignments in elementary and 
secondary schools where the court determined the racial classifications were simply used for 
illegitimate racial balancing.173  The Court held that the districts failed to satisfy strict scrutiny by 
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showing the use of racial classifications in assigning students was necessary to achieve their goal 
of diversity.174  Using a novel interpretation of Brown, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that racial 
integration was not a compelling interest and concluded that the goal of voluntarily promoting and 
maintaining integration was unconstitutional.175   
 Justice Stevens, dissenting, noted the irony of Chief Justice Roberts’ reliance on Brown 
and his rewriting of “the history of one of this Court’s most important decisions.”176  Justice Breyer, 
also dissenting, noted that the majority’s opinion “distorts precedent, it misapplies the relevant 
constitutional principles, and it announces legal rules that will obstruct” government efforts to 
contend with the problem of re-segregation of public schools.177  This decision is a classic example 
of the Court changing the direction of equal protection law from remedying structural inequality 
resulting from centuries of subordination to merely focusing on the use of race as a classification.  
Chief Justice Roberts literally reinterpreted Brown to stand for the determination that voluntary 
integration is unconstitutional. 
 The impact of segregation on the education of African Americans should not be 
underestimated.178  Educational policy alone cannot adequately address the unequal educational 
opportunities suffered by African American children;  to successfully address the racial academic 
achievement gap, strategies must combat the economic isolation resulting from the segregation of 
African Americans in addition to school reforms.179  The quality of education is linked to the 
segregation of African Americans.180  Residential integration, school integration, and increasing 
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economic parity need to be effectively addressed to promote equal educational opportunities.181  
Racial and economic segregation of neighborhoods and schools are “key factors” in the racial 
academic achievement gaps found in American cities.182 
VI. Higher Education of African Americans as a Compelling Government Interest 
 Beginning with Justice Powell’s decision in Bakke, the Supreme Court began to recognize 
the goal of attaining the educational benefits of a diverse student body as a compelling government 
interest to justify the use of race in affirmative action admissions policies.183  This is the one 
compelling interest where the Court has upheld the use of race in admissions policies, other than 
a university’s remedying the present effects of its own past discrimination.184  Because the Court 
refuses to acknowledge the reality of unequal educational opportunities for African Americans that 
universities would like to address in their admissions policies, universities must create admissions 
policies that fit within this ill-fitting concept of “educational benefits of a diverse student body.”185  
Constitutionally, the government must remedy the present effects of its own past discrimination.186  
Therefore, the government’s past discrimination leading to systematic de jure segregation and 
resulting in the miseducation of African Americans should be considered a compelling government 
interest that can be remedied by public universities and private universities receiving public 
funding. 
 Originally, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, along with the other 
reconstruction amendments, protected the rights of African Americans.187  The federal, state, and 
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local government action that promoted de jure segregation violated and continues to violate the 
constitutional rights of African Americans.  The effects of de jure segregation flowing from such 
state action as discriminatory housing, employment, and education policies impact African 
Americans today and continue to manifest in the enduring unequal educational opportunities for 
African Americans.188  Because government action is responsible for unconstitutional de jure 
segregation and the resulting miseducation of African Americans, the government has a 
compelling interest in remedying the harmful effects of its actions.189  When applied to the context 
of affirmative action in admissions, perhaps one question is whether an individual has a slave 
ancestor to invoke equal protection remediation specifically obligated because of the government’s 
unconstitutional treatment of African Americans. 
 As discussed in Brown v. Board of Education, the evolution of public education requires 
the Supreme Court to consider the present impact of segregation on public education and 
education’s current place in American society.190  Because a bachelor’s degree today is arguably 
equivalent to a high school diploma of decades ago and there is a need for skilled workers in 
today’s job market, the Brown decision should be extended to include public higher education.191  
Providing public higher education should also be viewed as a “most important function of state 
and local government” and as “a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”192 
 The question that must be addressed is whether African Americans are being equally 
protected under the law when it comes to higher public education.  Are public universities 
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segregated institutions that are intentionally keeping African Americans out?  Given the unequal 
education of African Americans, is their right to equal protection violated by subjecting them to 
the same standards for standardized test scores as the privileged white class?  By not addressing 
the reality of the multigenerational disparity in educational opportunities between white and black 
Americans, facially neutral admissions policies may really be the equivalent to “white affirmative 
action.” 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 The African American experience in America is relevant and must be considered when 
reviewing policies designed to mitigate the systematic oppression of African Americans as a result 
of unconstitutional government actions.  Remedying the effects of de jure segregation on the 
miseducation of African Americans is a compelling government interest that supports the 
strengthening of affirmative action admissions programs to safeguard the rights of African 
Americans under the Equal Protection Clause.  Given the level of education required to be 
successful in today’s workforce and the move towards free public higher education (e.g., New 
York State), higher public education must be open and accessible to African Americans.  It is no 
longer sufficient to have access to only a primary and secondary education.  Finally, the privileges 
of white domination enjoyed by and benefitting generations of whites cannot be left out of the 
analyses when determining the constitutionality of necessary reforms.  
     
